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FREEDOM OF SILENCE:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST
GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSIONS IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Charles B. Nutting*

P

ARADOXICALLY enough, the "right" to be silent has been
vociferously asserted by some of our most loquacious citizens. The
current activities of Congressional investigating committees and the
possible enactment of laws regulating participation in certain political
affairs make timely a consideration of the basis for the assertion of
the "right" and an attempt to determine the extent to which it may
be said truly to be protected against intrusions by the state or national
governments. It is proposed first to consider the question of secrecy
in connection with the elective process itself and later to extend the
inquiry into problems connected with political beliefs and activities in
general.

I·
THE BALLOT
A. Historic Beginnings of the Use of the Ballot in the
American Colonies
Whether or not secrecy of the ballot is protected by the Constitution of the United States, it clearly is not one of those rights which,
like fair trial, has come to us through the traditional common law.
Indeed, until recent times secrecy in parliamentary elections did not
exist, although the concept of the secret ballot must surely have been
known in England for centuries.1 Be this as it may, the practice was
such as to make evident the choice of each individual voter. Originally,
parliamentary elections were determined viva voce or by a show of
hands, the sheriff, as the official in charge of election, deciding and
indicating in his return who had been chosen. Although gradual recognition of the right to a poll was accorded 2 and was fully established
by 1696,8 this poll was not secret in character since the name of each

* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.

1

See MuRRAY, A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1888), definition of "ballot,,,
where the use of the word by Milton and others is shown. The earliest instance given
is THOMAS, HIST. hALIE (1549) referring to Venice.
2
BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 157 (1893).
8
7 & 8 Wm. 3, c. 25 (1896); WIGMORE, THE AusTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM
IO

(1889).
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voter and the candidate for whom he voted were entered in a poll
list maintained by those conducting the election.4
In view of the English practice, it is not surprising that the charters
granted by the Crown for the establishment of colonies on the North
American continent contain nothing which would lead to the conclusion
that secrecy in the election of officials was required or even regarded
as desirable. It is true that most of the charters indicate that the
election of members of the legislative body was contemplated but they
are silent as to the manner in which the elections were to be conducted. 5
However, the tradition of secrecy through the use of the ballot
has the sanction of antiquity in this country although it did not come
by way of England. In Massachusetts, as early as 1634, the governor
and deputy 6 as well as the assistants were chosen by ballot. 7 Indeed,
throughout the colonial period the use of the ballot in such circumstances as to guarantee substantial secrecy characterized elections of
the principal executive officers and the legislators of the New England
colonies.8 Temporary exceptions to the practice are found, as in Rhode
Island, where for a short time beginning in I 7 I 5 voters were required
to sign their ballots, due to the action of "sundry loose and fractious
freemen of said colony, in putting or delivering into the hat sometimes
two, three or more votes for one officer...." 9 This system was soon
abandoned, however, because it was found to cause "great dissatisfaction
and uneasiness to many of the good people of this colony, who deem it
a very great hardship to have their names exposed upon such occasions,
to the creating of animosity and heart-burning of their particular
friends. . . ." 10 Also, the use of proxy voting necessitated by the
expansion of the colonies and the consequent difficulty of requiring all
4
BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 158 (1893); 7 &
8 Wm. 3, c. 25 (1696).
5
The Charter of New England and the Bradford Charter of New Plymouth
contained on provision for the election of legislative officers. In several of the early
charters, for example, Delaware (1701); New Jersey (1664); North Carolina (1663);
Pennsylvania (1682) and Virginia (1621), provision was made for the "choosing'' of
legislators, while in still others, for example, Georgia (1732) and Massachusetts Bay
(1629), provision for "election" is made. See the respective charters as contained in
THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CoNSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAws, 1492-1908
(1909).
6 BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 141 (1893).
7
Id. 142.
8
Id. 141-155.
9
4 RHODE ISLAND COLONIAL RECORDS 195 (1859); BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 148 (1893).
lO 4 RHODE ISLAND COLONIAL RECORDS 207 (1859); BISHOP, ibid.
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the voters to come in person to the court of general election tended in
at least one instance to destroy the secrecy of the ballot so far as those
casting proxy votes were concerned.11 But it is fair to state that in the
main the element of secrecy was preserved.
Apparently, written ballots were cast in many instances but in some
cases other methods were used. Thus, for a period beginning in I 643
the assistants in the Massachusetts Bay Colony were chosen by "Indian
beanes, the white beanes to manifest election, the black for blanks." 12
The corn or bean ballot was also used in New Haven, but in Rhode
Island and Hartford written ballots were required. The Fundamental
Orders of Connecticut in 1638-39 provided that magistrates should
be chosen by "one single paper." The name of the candidate was
written on the paper to indicate a favorable vote. The blank paper was
cast for an unfavorable vote. It was provided that "every one that hath
more written papers than blanks shall be a Magistrate for that yeare.ma
Considerable speculation has arisen regarding the origin of the
secret ballot as far as its use in colonial America is concerned. The
ballot, of course, was used in Greece and Rome in early times,14 and
northern Europeans at least as early as the sixteenth century were
aware of its use in Venice.15 However, it seems probable that those who
later came to New England first observed it in Holland, and particularly in the Dutch churches. Douglas Campbell 1° points out that in
Emden which, although not in the Netherlands proper, is culturally
Dutch, elections by ballot were held. This town was familiar to the
English Puritans, thousands of whom visited the city. William Penn
also resided there just prior to going to Pennsylvania. Campbell also
11

The proxy system seems to have been in general use in New England during
the colonial period and for some time thereafter. Under this system the votes were
generally cast at town meetings and carried to the general court of elections. BISHOP,
HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN CoLoNIES 148 (1893) states that in Rhode
Island those voting by proxy were required to sign their votes, although this was not
the general practice.
12
2 Records of Massachusetts Bay ( 18 53) 42. Another instance is recorded at
page 220, ibid.
18
1 THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CoNsTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS 519 at

520 (1909).
14

Gosnell, Article on the Ballot, 2 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 410 (1930).
Supra, note l.
16
2 CAMPBELL, THE PURITAN IN ENGLAND, HoLLAND AND AMERICA 43 1 et seq.
(1892). It is also believed that many of the colonial election practices, including the
use of the "lot'' were derived from Harrington's OCEANA. See B1sHoP, HISTORY OF
ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 126 (1893); 3 ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL
PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY 213 (1937).
15
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states that elections. of officers by ballot were held in various Dutch
churches and that the Puritans were doubtless aware of the practice.
Corroboration of Campbell's theory.seems to be furnished not only
by the general use of the ballot in New England but also by the recognition of this method of voting in Pennsylvania and to some extent in
other proprietary colonies where Puritan influence was substantial.
Penn's Frame of Government of 1682 provided that all elections to
the council and general assembly should be by ballot.17 However, it
has been stated on apparently reliable authority that in practice the
ballot was used in Pennsylvania only when an election viva voce or
by show of hands was in doubt and that it actually took the place of
the English poll.18 In any event, when the procedure was prescribed by
statute in 1706, secrecy depended on the option of the voter, who might
use the simple English poll if he wished to do so.19
In East New Jersey an elaborate system of election to the council
was prescribed by the Fundamental Constitutions for the Province in
1683. Certain persons of a group selected by ballot were chosen by lot
as being eligible for office. A number of these were proposed for further
consideration by ·"nominators" who themselves had been chosen by
the original ballot but had not been selected by the lot. Final selection
from among the nominees :was also by ballot. Of possible interest to
modern students of government was the requirement that the nominators should solemnly declare before the sheriff "that they shall not
name any known by them to be guilty for the time, or to have been
guilty for a year before, of adultery, whoredom, druµkeness, or any
such immorality, or who is insolvent, or a fool. ..." 20 •
On the other hand, colonies whose governing inhabitants had not
been exposed to influences from Holland or other parts of continental
Europe appear for the most part to have followed the traditional
English procedure. Thus, Virginia, New York (although apparently
not without opposition from the Dutch inhabitants, as will appear
later 21 ) Maryland, Georgia and New Jersey (after the surrender of
the proprietary charter in 1701) seem to have conducted their elections
17
5 THoRPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CoNsTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAws 3052
at 3059 (1909).
18
BisHoP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE AMERICAN CoLoNIES 167-~69 (1893).
19
4 Anne, c. 23, as printed in Laws of the Province of Pennsylvania (Bradford,

1714) p. 53•
20
5 THORPE, AMERICAN CHAR'fERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS 2574
at 2575 (1909). It appears that Dutch and New England Puritan settlements had been
established in this area during the seventeenth century. 3 ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL
PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY 141 (1937).
21
Infra, pp. 185, 186.
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through the mechanism of the voice vote and the English poll. 22 North
Carolina in 1760 provided that a poll was to be maintained and that
votes were to be given openly. 23 South Carolina, however, was an
exception to the general practice, since it was provided that each elector
should vote on a "piece of Paper, rolled up, wherein is written the
Names of the Representatives he votes for, and to which Paper the
Elector shall not be required to subscribe his Name...." 24
During the colonial period, then, both the secret ballot and the
traditional English system were in general use and to some extent,
as in Pennsylvania, a fusion of the two systems was in operation.
However, the written ballot seems to have appealed to the colonists
generally as it became more familiar to them, for an examination of
the early state constitutions indicates that the use of the written ballot
for the purpose of electing state officers was quite generally required.
This was true, either expressly or by clear implication as to Connecticut,
Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. 25 In New York, the legislature was
22
Virginia Laws 1662-1715 (1727) p. 195. This law, enacted in 1699, follows
and refers to the act of 7 & 8 Wm. 3, c. 25 (1696); New York Acts, 7 Wm. & Mary
(Sept. 5, 1700) as printed in Acts of Assembly 1691-1725 (Bradford, 1726) p. 3i;
Maryland, Act of 1716, c. XI as printed in I Laws of Maryland (Nicklin, 18 1 I) p. 137;
Georgia, Act of June 9, 1761 as printed in BISHOP, HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN THE
AMERICAN COLONIES 279 (1893); New Jersey, Act of Aug. 13, 1725 as printed in Acts
of the General Assembly of the Province of New Jersey, 1702-1776 (Allinson, 1776).
23
Act 33 Geo. 2, c. I ( l 760) as printed in Complete Revi;al of the Acts of
Assembly of North Carolina (Davis, 1773) 247.
24
Act 1721 as printed in Laws of the Province of South Carolina (Trott, 1736)
pp. 373, 374. It is not clear why South Carolina should have differed in this respect
from the other proprietary colonies. A possible explanation, which would lend support
to the Campbell theory, is that Puritans and other groups of Dissenters made up some 40
per cent of the population, and that the Hugenots were also influential in the affairs
of the colony. See 3 ANDREWS, THE CoLONIAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY 242
(1937).
25
Connecticut Const. (1818) Art. VI, § 7, l THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS,
CoNSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS 536 at 544 (1909); Georgia Const. (1777) Art.
IX, 2 id. 777 at 779. [For some reason Georgia changed its position in I 798 when
Art. IV, § 2 of the constitution provided for a viva voce vote unless the legislature should
otherwise direct. In February, 1799 the legislature passed a law specifying viva voce
voting but this was repealed and the ballot required in December of the same year.
See Geo. Laws ( I 799) as printed in Marbury and Crawford's Digest 199, 202 ( 1802) ] .
Massachusetts Const. (1780) c. I,§ II, Art. II; c. I, § III, Art. III, 3 THORPE, id.
1888 at 1895, 1898; New Hampshire Const. (1784), Part II, 4 THORPE, id. 2453
at 2459, 2461; North Carolina Const. (1776) Arts. II and III, 5 THORPE, id. 2787 at
2790; Pennsylvania Const. (1776) § 9, 5 THORPE, id. 3081 at 3084; Rhode Island
Const. (1842) Art. VIII, §§ 2, 3, 6 THORPE, id. 3222 at 3230; Vermont Const.
(1777) c. II,§ VIII, 6 THORPE, id. 3737 at 3742.
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permitted to provide for ballot voting and to abolish that method if
it should "be found less conducive to the safety or interest of the State
than the method of voting v~a voce." 26 Delaware, New Jersey and
Virgi11.ia made no provision for the manner of voting in the earliest
constitutions, although in 1792 Delaware joined the majority of the
states by adopting a constitutional provision requiring the use of the
ballot. 2 ' South Carolina provided that elections should be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the election law previously referred
to. 28 Only Maryland, in 1776, insisted on the retention of viva voce
voting for delegates to the legislative body. 29
Modern state constitutions very generally require that elections of
state officers be by ballot. 30 In a few instances the legislature is empowered to prescribe other methods of voting but in each such case it
is specified that secrecy must be preserved,81 and the legislatures have
required the use of the ballot or of voting machines.32 It is clear that
the principle of voting by ballot except in some instances involving
purely local offices has now become definitely established in the United
States as a result of action in all of the states presumably occasioned
by popular demand for this method of expressmg the will of the
electorate.
26
New York Const. (1777) Art. VI, 5 THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAws 2623 at 2630 (1909). Apparently the legislature originally
provided for the use of the ballot in the election of the governor and the lieutenant
governor only. In 1787 the use of the ballot was provided for in elections of assemblymen.
tbid.
.
27
Del. Const. (1792) Art. IV, § 1, I THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CoNSTITUTI0Ns AND ORGANIC LAws 568 at 574 (1909).
28
Const.. ( I 776) Art. XI, 6 THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND
ORGANIC LAws 3245 (1909); supra, note 24.
29
Md. Const. (1776) Part 2, Arts. II, IV, XIV, 3 THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS,
CoNSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAws 1686 at 1691, 1693 (1909).
30
See LUDINGTON, AMERICAN BALLOT LAws, 1888-1910 (1911), where the
various constitutional provisions are set out. After the publication of this work, New
Mexico became a state and its constitution contains such a provision. N.M. Const. (1911)
Art. VII, § 5. New Jersey seems to have no constitutional provision requiring the use
of the ballot but its laws provide for the use of ballots and voting machines. New Jersey
Rev. Stat. (1937) 19:14, 19:48. The Oregon Constitution of 1857, Art. II, § 15
provides that"••• in all elections by the people, votes shall be given openly or viva voce,
until legislative assembly shall otherwise direct." The legislature has provided for the
use of ballots. 5 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) §§ 81-1501 et seq.
31
Ariz. Const. (1911) Art. VII,§ I; Cal. Const. (1879) Art. II,§ 5 (as amended,
Nov. 3, 1896); N.Y. Const. (1938) Art. II, § 7; Pa. Const. (1873) Art. VIII, § 4,
as amended 190 I.
32
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §§ 55-401 et seq.; Cal. Elections Code (Deering,
1939) §§ 3700 et seq.; 17 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1943) Arts 5, 9; 25 Pa.
Stat. (Purdon, 1938) 2961 et seq.
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B. Secrecy as an Object of Ballot Voting
The evidence shows almost beyond question that, in requiring the
use of the ballot, the framers of the constitutions intended to preserve
the New England tradition of secrecy rather than simply to create a
means by which votes could be cast and counted more readily. The
meaning attached to the word "ballot" by general usage in itself indicates the truth of the assertion. 33 Confirmation is also afforded by the
provisions in modern constitutions, previously referred to, 34 that other
methods of voting may be provided by the legislature only if secrecy
is preserved. In addition, early cases in which the term as used in state
constitutions is interpreted uniformly recognize that .secrecy, rather
than the form in which the vote is cast, is the controlling factor.
These cases, although neither numerous, nor, for the most part,
sufficiently old to constitute contemporaneous evidence of constitutional
meaning can, it is believed, be regarded as authoritative in view of the
uniformity of the result reached. They are chiefly concerned either with
the question of the privilege of a voter to refuse to reveal how he has
exercised his franchise 35 or with the use of voting machines instead of
the written ballot.36 Cases in the former category recognize the voter's
privilege as being founded on the policy, implicit in the constitutional
provisions, that elections by ballot shall be secret. Thus Christiancy, J .,
concurring in People v. Cicott, states:
"The object of this requirement [ voting by ballot] ... is too
plain to be misunderstood. It was to secure the entire independence
of the electors, to enable them to vote according to their own
individual convictions of right and duty, without the fear of giving
offense or exciting the hostility of others. And with this view
the right is secured to every voter of concealing from all others,
or from such of them as he may choose, the nature of his vote, or
for what person or party he may have voted." 87
88

See Wigmore, "Ballot Reform: Its Constitutionality," 23 AM. L. REv. 719
at 725 (1889) where numerous examples supporting this conclusion are given.
84
Supra, note 3 I.
85
Denio, Ch. J., in People v. Pease, 27 N.Y. 45 at 81 (1863). This is a dissenting
opinion, but the statement referred to is apparently accepted by the court. People v.
Cicott, 16 Mich. 283 at 3 II, 312 (1868); Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89 at 95 (1871).
For later cases recognizing the same principle see 90 A.L.R. 1362 (1934).
86
Ohio ex rel. Automatic Registering Machine Co. v. Green, 121 Ohio St. 301,
168 N.E. 131 (1929); Lynch v. Malley, 215 ill. 574, 74N.E. 723 (1905); Spickerman
v. Goddard, 182 Ind. 523, 107 N.E. 2 (1914); State ex rel. Fenner v. Keating, 53
Mont. 371, 163 P. u56-(1917). See 66 A.L.R. 855 (1930). An early case embodying
the same principle is Temple v. Mead, 4 Vt. 535 (1832), holding that a printed ballot
rather than one written by hand satisfied the requirement of a written ballot.
87
16 Mich. 283 at 311,312 (1868).
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Opinions dealing with the use of voting machines also confirm the
view previously stated. They are based on the proposition that the
word "ballot" as used in constitutional provisions is not to be taken
literally in the sense of requiring a written vote or any other particular
form, but rather to signify secret as opposed to viva voce or other
types of public voting. 88
However, although the constitutional policy is clear, it is equally
evident that constitutional provisions cannot in themselves guarantee
the secrecy which they are designed to attain. Even though, as Cooley
has stated, ". . . all devices by which party managers are enabled to
distinguish ballots in the hand of the voter, and thus determine
whether he is voting for or against them, are opposed to the spirit of
the Constitution. . . ." 39 The general requirement of the use of the
ballot in popular elections did not in fact result in secrecy in any substantial sense.
The written ballot, as opposed to viva voce voting, makes secrecy
possible in that the choice of the voter is not necessarily made public.
However, it can be effective in securing secrecy only if it is employed
in such a way as to prevent the action of the voter from becoming
known. -It was at this point that the system broke down. Early election
laws did not prescribe the form or appearance of the ballot, nor did they
require ballots to be furnished by public authority. As a result, candidates or political organizations would provide voters with ballots which
had been prepared before hand and which could be identified by their
shape or color. Since the voters were not sufficiently protected from
public view while casting their ballots, watchers could determine what
ballots were being cast and hence how the electors had voted. 4 ° Consequently, the element of secrecy was almost entirely lacking, even
though in theory it was regarded as the essential feature of voting by
ballot.
Thus the ballot, which was designed to secure honest elections
through insuring secrecy, became an instrument of corruption. Although in colonial times rudimentary forms of ballot box stuffing may -·
have been in existence,41 it was not until the nineteenth century that
corrupt elections became a matter of great popular indignation. The
38

39
40

Supra, note 36.
CooLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL L1MITATI0Ns,
EvANs,

A

7th ed., 912 (1903).

H1sTORY OF TIIE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT IN TIIE UNITED STATES

(1917).
41

For example, the instance in Rhode Island referred to supra, p. 182.

6 et seq.
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growth of cities, the influx of ignorant voters and the development of
political machines coupled with an increase in the number of officials
chosen by popular vote made corruption easy as well as profitable. The
unofficial printed ballot facilitated the process, since voters could be
provided with the ballot to be cast and any failui;-e to obey orders
could easily be detected. Furthermore, other types of fraud, such as
inserting the names of certain candidates on ballots purporting to be
those of the opposition, could be perpetrated.42 The existence of
such conditions led to many complaints, such as that of the Citizen's
Municipal Reform Association, which stated in a memorial to the
Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of r 873: "It is not too much
to say that in Philadelphia . . . the perpetration of these frauds has
been reduced to a science, and systematized to that degree that the
confidence of the people in the result of an appeal to the ballot box is
being undermined with dangerous rapidity." 43
It should be noted, however, that the system of ballot voting failed
to secure honest elections, not because it was inherently objectionable
but rather because in practice it failed to attain the ends sought by its
proponents. The same sort of corruption, although its form was somewhat different, prevailed in England, where the poll was in operation.
There, while bribery was rife, intimidation was also present perhaps
to an even greater degree than was the case in the United States.
Jeremy Bentham noted the prevalence of both of these factors, which
he attributed to lack of secrecy, and as a result he advocated secret
voting as the only effective means of securing substantial freedom of
suffrage.44 Many other British publicists reached the same conclusion.45 Thus, both in Great Britain and the United States observers
saw that some means of guaranteeing secrecy was essential and that
existing methods of voting failed to provide it.
42
EVANS, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT IN THE UNITED STATES IO
et seq. (1917).
48
I DEBATES, CoNST. CoNv. OF PENNSYLVANIA 216 (1873). It is interesting to
note that the abandonment of secrecy was suggested as a cure for this situation, and that
a proposal was offered to the convention that voters be required to sign their ballots.
See 5 id. 134-140. This proposal was not adopted, but the convention did propose, and
the people adopted, a provision that "any elector may write his name upon his ticket."
Pa. Const. (1873) Art. VIII, § 4. This was changed in 1901, and the legislature was
directed to maintain the secrecy of the ballot.
44
3 BENTHAM, WoRKS, Bowring ed., 487 (1843).
45
Including James Mill, Peel, O'Connell, Bright, Lord Russell, Grote and Macauly.
WIGMORE, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM 13 (1889).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 47

In the meantime, a device had been developed in Australia, where
similar conditions existed, which seemed to offer a solution to the
problem. The so-called Australian Ballot was adopted in 1 856 by Victoria
and in 1857-1858 by South Australia.46 Although variations have since
been introduced, the essentials of this form were the printing and
distribution of uniform official ballots at public expense, the establishment of voting places where the voter was required to mark his ballot
privately just before casting it, and the provision that election officials
were prohibited from revealing how individual votes were cast.47 In
effect, the use of the Australian system provided for compulsory
secrecy. It made the use of bribery and intimidation to the extent which
previously had characterized popular elections much more difficult.
The Australian Ballot quickly found favor with those who advocated electoral reform. After an elaborate investigation it was adopted
in Great Britain through the passage of the Ballot Act of 18T2 48
which, although its operation was originally limited to a period of eight
years from its passage, was subsequently re!..enacted, so that Maitland
remarked," ... I suppose that we must regard it as having become in
fact a permanent part of the constitution." 49 In the United States,
agitation apparently commencing in 18 82 resulted in the enactment
during 188 8 of secret ballot laws, similar to the Australian act, in
Massachusetts and Kentucky, the latter law being confined to municipal
elections in Louisville. In New York, a law passed in the same year
was vetoed by the governor. 50 Today, the system is in almost universal
use throughout the United States and was iri use at least until recent
years, throughout western Europe.51
46
EvANs, A HISTORY OF THE AusTRALIAN BALLOT IN THE UNITED STATES 17
(1917).
47
ld. 27-35; Dana, "The Practical Working of the Australian System of Voting in
Massachusetts," 2 ANNALS 733, 736 (1892). See generally, McCRARY, LAW OF ELECTIONS, 4th ed., c. 22 (1897).
48
35 & 36 Viet., c. 33. See WIGMORE, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM 14
(1889); EVANS, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT IN THE UNITED STATES 17,
18 (1917); l LoWELL, THEGoVERNMENToFENGLAND 219etseq. (1912).
49
MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 370 (1909).
50
EVANS, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT IN THE UNITED STATES 18-20
(1917).
51
See LUDINGTON, AMERICAN BALLOT LAws, 1888-1910 (19n) for a collection
of the state laws. It is said that all but three states (South Carolina, Georgia and Delaware)
·have now adopted the Australian system. Gosnell, Article on the Ballot, 2 ENcYc. Soc.
Ser. 410 (1930). It appears that two of these, Georgia and Delaware, have joined the
majority. Ga. Ann. Code (Park, 1936) tit. 34, §§ 1901 et seq.; Del. Rev. Code (1935)
c. 60. The Georgia law, however, is not operative in any county until its adoption has
been recommended by two consecutive grand juries of such county.
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C. Secrecy after the Ballot has been Cast
In addition to the principle of ballot voting previously established,
the widespread legislative action referred to in the preceding section
established the further principle that compulsory secrecy in the casting
of votes is an essential element of the process of popular election. The
element of secrecy is also preserved •after the ballot ·has been cast.
Cases involving the legality of elections raise the problem and delineate
the extent of the protection accorded.
Even before the advent of the Australian system, judicial decisions
in the United States had established the rule that, where elections were
conducted by ballot, legal voters could not be compelled to reveal their
votes. Perhaps the earliest case is that of Johnston v. Charleston,5 2
decided in 1795. There, in an election contest involving rival claimants
to a municipal office, the contention was made that the city council
should swear the voters and compel them to state for whom they had
voted. The court refused to follow this argument, stating, according
to the reporter,
"That with respect to swearing the voters or compelling them
to declare for whom they gave their votes, it was a kind of inquisitorial power, unknown to the principles of our government and
constitution, and might be highly injurious to the suffrage of a
free people...." 53
The same result was reached by the Michigan court in the case of
People v. Cicott, previously referred to; s,1 and in People v. Pease/ 5
a New Yark case, the privilege of the voter to remain silent if questioned as to his vote was recognized by clear implication. Cases from
various other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion 56 and the
practice of legislative committees seems in general to have followed
the rule adopted by the courts. 57
Rather general recognition of the privilege is also found in statutes
establishing the Australian system. The original South Australian
52

1 Bay (S.C.) 441 (1795).

53

Id. at 442.

54

Supra, note 37.
27 N.Y. 45 (1863). The court stated that the voter might be asked for whom he
had voted but if he refuses to say, his vote might be shown by circumstantial evidence.
56
See 90 A.L.R. 1362 (1934). Most of the cases cited appear to have been decided
before the adoption of the Australian system in the respective states. No case has been
found which denies the privilege to a legal voter.
57
"When the voting is by ballot, a voter is not compellable to disclose the character
of his vote, or to testify for whom he voted, on a given occasion." CusHING, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES, 9th ed., 73 (1899).
55
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Ballot law 58 has no specific provision dealing with the problem, although the existence of the privilege seems to be implied necessarily
by the statutory language. The British Act of I 872 expressly provides
that no person who has voted at an election shall, in any legal proceeding, be required to state for whom he has voted. 59 In Canada,
the Dominion Elections Act of I 920 substantially adopts the language
of the British Act 60 as does a law of Ontario. 61 The pattern in the
United States is somewhat different. A number of states have recognized the privilege by implication through provisions that, if it is
determined that a person has voted illegally, he may be questioned as
to the candidate for whom-his ballot was cast.6 z
The last sentence indicates that legislation on the subject has
confined the privilege to the legal voter. In this respect, the statutes
follow the case law which, even in the absence of legislation, has
developed the rule that only legal voters are protected,63 subject, of
course, to the privilege against self-incrimination. 64 Such a qualification
of the privilege seems clearly justified. Protection of the legal voter is
necessary in order to insure honest elections, free from intimidation,
bribery and other forms of corrupt influence. However, if a person
not qualified to vote has succeeded in doing so, an inquiry into his
action is necessary if dishonesty at the polls is to be discovered and
punished. A much more doubtful limitation of the privilege of nondisclosure is found in the practice of legislative bodies, followed by
some courts, of permitting the introduction of circumstantial evidence
indicating how qualified voters have exercised the franchise. 6 " Apart
58
See EvANs, A H1sTORY OF THE AusTRALIAN BALLOT IN THE UNITED STATES,
Appendix A (1917). Section 45 of the act states that the court created for deciding
election contests shall have power to inquire "simply into the identity of the persons,
and whether their votes were improperly admitted or rejected, assuming the roll to be
correct."
59
35 & ~6 Viet., c. 33, § 12.
60
Laws of Canada, 1o & l l Geo. 5, c. 46 ( l 920).
61
Ont. Rev. Stat. (1937) c. 8, § 164.
6
z Alabama Code Ann. (1940) tit. 17, § 233; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) § 33-1717
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1935) § 25-1426; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 32-1028;
New Jersey Rev. Stat. (1937) § 19:29-7; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann (Michie, 1943)
§ 120-II.
63
The cases are collected in 90 A.L.R. 1362 (1934).
64
See 8 WIGMORE, EvrnENcE, 3d ed., § 2214 ( l 940). With the exception of the
New Jersey law, the statutes cited supra, note 62, provide for immunity for those required
to testify.
65
See CusHING, LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES, 9th ed., 73
(1899); McCRARY, LAW OF ELECTIONS, 4th ed., 363 (1897); People v. Pease, 27
N.Y. 45 (1863); People v. Teague, 106 N.C. 576, II S.E. 665 (1890); CooLEY,
CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 7th ed., 913 (1903).
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from the unreliability of such evidence, it would seem to lessen the
protection which should be accorded the voter without a sufficient
compensating advantage to the public in the prevention of corrupt
practices. However, as Wigmore states,6° the matter seems to be of
little practical importance.
In view of the principle of compulsory secrecy introduced by the
adoption of the Australian system it is somewhat surprising to note that
the cases have almost uniformly held the privilege of nondisclosure
to be one which may be waived by the voter. 67 In this respect it differs,
for example, from the duty of secrecy which is placed upon a member
of a grand jury. It has been argued that from the standpoint of public
policy, the secrecy of the ballot is so important that its waiver by an
individual voter should not be permitted. 0 s However, the counter
argument which justifiably has had more weight with the courts is
that it should be possible through voluntary action on the part of witnesses, to bring to light and punish dishonest practices. Secrecy, after
all, is but a means of securing honest elections. As McCrary states:
"It would be a strange perversion of the rule which preserves
the secrecy of the ballot for the purpose of encouraging free and
independent voting, to make it serve to shield the fraud and corruption of those who would, by tampering with or changing ballots
after they are cast, altogether deprive the majority of the electors
of their choice." 00
The fact that the voter is permitted to waive his privilege might,
at first impression, lead to the conclusion that secrecy is accorded solely
in the individual interest of the voter himself. Some evidence exists
in support of this notion. In colonial Rhode Island, as has previously
been stated,7° the requirement of secrecy was reintroduced in order to
save the electors from embarrassment. The language of the cases cited
above 71 tends to indicate that the privilege exists in order to prevent
66

8 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2214 (1940).
90A.L.R. 136.,2 at 1365 (1934).
68
Thus, the Ontario Court of Appeals has held, in interpreting the statute referred
to supra, note 61, that the policy of the law requires the complete exclusion of the
testimony of the voter. In re Lincoln Election Petition, 4 Ont. App. Rep. 206 (1879).
A lower court in Pennsylvania reached the same conclusion under a Pennsylvariia law
which allowed the questioning of illegal voters. Fowler v. Feltholl, (Pa. Com. Pl. Schuylkill Co. 1877) I Leg. Rec. Rep. 145, 152. In Major v. Barker, 99 Ky. 305, 35 S.W. 543
(1896), the Kentucky court stated that the general policy of secrecy prevented the
voluntary disclosure by the voter of how his vote was cast.
69
LAW OF ELECTIONS, 4th ed., 362 (1897).
70
Supra, p. 182.
71
Supra, notes 54, 5 5, 56.
67
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reprisals against recalcitrant voters. However, further consideration
shows that the primary interest safeguarded is a social rather than an
individual one. The almost universal requirement of the secret ballot,
as exemplified by the Australian system, came into existence, as has
been stated, because of the need to preserve the honesty and freedom
of elections. It was but one of a number of devices creat~d for the
purpose of outlawing corrupt and illegal practices.
For the purposes of this discussion corrupt practice legislation need
not be considered to any great extent. In order to :fit our problem into
its context, however, certain observations should be made. The extension of the system of popular suffrage created opportunities. for corruption which raised serious questions as to its effectiveness as a means
of expressing the true will of the electorate. Violence, bribery, fraud
and intimidation were common. Huge sums of money were used for
the purpose of buying votes. Voters were intimidated by landlords,
employers and others having special interests in the outcome of elections.
Corporations contributed heavily to political parties in the expectation
of future favors. Blocks of votes were delivered en masse by political
bosses. Ballot boxes were stuffed, fraudulent ballots were circulated
and many enthusiasts carried out very literally the injunction to "vote
early and often." 72
Because of these conditions, a growing demand for reform resulted
in the enactment of elaborate legislative schemes to regulate election
practices. Many of the provisions are parts of general laws which
impose compulsory secrecy on voters and elections officials. In the
· main, in addition to prohibiting bribery and similar offenses, such
legislation involves limitation of expenditures for campaign purposes,
regulation of contributions and disbursements, proper designation of
campaign literature and provision for publicity in connection with
political contributions. 73 Every state in the union has enacted legislation
on this subject, as has the federal government ....-1 Similar laws have
been adopted in Great Britain 75 and in the British Commonwealth of
Nations.76
·
72 See generally, WIGMORE, THE AusTRALIAN BALLOT 12-14 (1889); EvANS,
A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT IN THE UNITED STATES 6-16 (1917); l
LoWELL, THE GoVERNMENT OF ENGLAND 219-223 (1912).
78
BEST, CORRUPT PRACTICES AT ELECTIONS iii (1937).
74
The laws are collected in B_EST, CoRRUPT PRACTICES AT ELECTIONS ( 193 7).
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Viet., c. 51.
76 For example, Canada, Dominion Elections Act, l 920, Rev. Stat. of Canada,
c. 53 (1927); Australia, Commonwealth Electoral Act, 1927, l Commonwealth Acts,
1901-1935 (1936) 842; New Zealand, Electoral Act, 1927, New Zealand Laws, 18
Geo.5,No.44·(1927).
'
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Obviously, then, the social interest in honest elections is of the
greatest importance. One of the means by which that interest can be
protected is through the secrecy of the ballot which, in turn, is accomplished by requiring secrecy from the individual voter at the time the
ballot is cast and by according him the privilege of secrecy thereafter.
But the extent of the privilege depends primarily on considerations of
social utility rather than on the convenience of the individual. In a
sense, protection is always granted to individual interests for social
reasons, but here it would seem that, unlike, for example, situations
involving the privilege against self-incrimination or the right of free
speech, the social interest is relatively more immediate and direct than
is that of the individual.
·

D. Extent of Protection of Secrecy of the Ballot under the
United States Constitution
The evidence presented in the foregoing pages establishes the fact
that secrecy in voting both at the time the ballot is cast and thereafter,
unless the voter chooses to waive his privilege, is now accorded almost
universal recognition by the constitutions, statutes or case law of the
various American and British jurisdictions. It now remains to discover,
if possible, the extent to which this principle is given protection by the
Constitution of the United States.
To begin with, Congress unquestionably may protect the secrecy
of the ballot by appropriate legislation, not only against governmental
intrusions, but against individual action as well, as far as elections to
membership in that body are concerned. Article I, section 4 of the
Constitution clearly indicates this in connection with members of the
House of Representatives,11 and the Seventeenth Amendment, providing for popular election of senators, implies a similar result with
respect to such election. 78 The power of Congress also extends to the
process by which presidential electors are chosen, at least to the extent
necessary to maintain the secrecy of the ballot and hence, the honesty of
elections.10
77
Paragraph l of this section is as follows: "The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators." In 1870 a law dealing
extensively with corrupt practices in Congressional elections was enacted. 16 Stat. L.
144 (1870). See United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 at 482, 37 S.Ct. 407 (1917).
78
This amendment does not expressly authorize Congressional regulation but since,
as is pointed out in the text, a constitutional right is created, it seems evident that the
power to protect the exercise of that right must exist. The Federal Corrupt Practices
Act, 2 U.S.C. (1946) § 241 et seq., covers senatorial elections. See infra, note 79.
79
Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 54 S.Ct. 102 (1934).
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Basically, the legal justification of federal control over Congressional
elections is that the right of electors qualified by state law to vote in such
elections is derived directly from the Constitution itself and not from the
states. Although, as just indicated, the enjoyment of the right is limited
to those who are qualified as electors of the most numerous branch of
the state legislature, 80 this circumstance does not affect its fundamental
character. 81 The right being thus established, Congress clearly has the
power to provide for its protection. 82 In the case of presidential electors,
the rationalization is somewhat different. Here, the power of the federal
government to protect the election of its chief executive from corruption
seems to derive not from any specific constitutional grant but rather from
a general, perhaps a "natural law," principle that any government has
an inherent power to take measures necessary for self protection.83 If,
as the case of Burroughs and Cannon 84 established, Congress may validly
regulate campaign contributions in connection with such elections, it
seems obvious that provisions requiring secrecy in voting may also be
enacted.·
Although, as far as has been discovered, the point has not been
directly decided, existing legislation in itself probably would protect
against both governmental and individual interference with the secret
ballot in federal elections. 85 In this connection it is necessary to consider
the character of the right established by the Constitution. Obviously,
more is involved than the mere placing of a marked ballot in a box. The
right to vote includes the right to have the vote counted 86 and also the
right to vote freely, that.is, without being subjected to coercion or undue
influence. This is particularly important because not only is the interest
of the individual involved but also the social interest in the selection of
governmental officials by honest methods. As Justice Miller stated in
Ex Parte Yarbrough:
"This duty [ of protection of the voter by the government]
does not arise solely from the interest of the party concerned, but
from the necessity of the government itself, that its service shall

° Const., Art. I, § 2.

8

81

Ex parte Yarbrough, IIO U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152 (1884).
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 12 S.Ct. 617 (1892).
83
Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 54 S.Ct. 102 (1934).
84
Ibid.
85
Section 19 of the Criminal Code, I 8 U.S.C. ( 1946) § 51, in substance penalizes
interference with any citizen "in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States."
86
United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 35 S.Ct. 904 (1915).
82
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be free from the adverse influence of force and fraud practised on
its agents, and that the votes by which its members of Congress and
its President are elected shall be the free votes of the electors, and
the officers thus chosen the free and uncorrupted choice of those who
have the right to take part in that choice." 87

If, as has been suggested, the almost universal experience of the
states and, indeed, of the English speaking world has been that freedom
in the exercise of the franchise, as well as fairness in elections, can be
attained only through preserving the principle of secret voting, it follows
that the right to vote freely, as established by the Constitution, means
the right to vote secretly. Hence, interference with secret voting in federal elections, at least, would be interference with a constitutional right
and would also constitute violation of existing civil rights legislation.
The conclusion just stated has an important bearing on the most
difficult problem involved in this aspect of the discussion. To what extent
does the Constitution of the United Sts1,tes protect the secrecy of the
ballot in state elections? At the outset, it must be observed that under
the Constitution the states are left free to determine the qualifications
of electors, except for the limitations as to race and sex imposed by the
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. Literacy tests, property requirements and other conditions to voting have been imposed by the
states and are valid unless used as means of violating the amendments
just mentioned.~ 8 Possibly a state might even abolish the popular election
of state officers entirely without running afoul of any judicially enforceable constitutional provision.80 All of this makes difficult the conclusion
that state elections can be regarded as subject to constitutional protection
except in the specific situations named.
However, reasonable grounds exist to support the conclusion that
all those who are regarded by the state as being qualified electors are
constitutionally entitled as against the state to vote secretly and to
refuse to reveal how they have voted. Secret voting (including the
privilege of nondisclosure) may be regarded as a "liberty" protected
87

110 U.S. 651 at 662, 4 S.Ct. 152 (1884).
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 58 S.Ct. 205 (1937); Pope v. Williams,
193 U.S. 621, 24 S.Ct. 573 (1904). See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35
S.Ct. 926 (1915).
89
Although it might be argued that popular election of major state officials is
included in the concept of a "republican form of government" guaranteed by Article
IV, § 4 of the Constitution, this would appear to be a political question which the courts
would not decide. See Luther v. Borden, 7 How. (48 U.S.) I (1849).
88

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 47

against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment and by civil rights
legislation enacted thereunder. 90
Probably the most useful analogy which can be offered in support
of this conclusion is to be found in the cases protecting persons accused
of crime from state action lacking the elements of "fair trial." Although
the development of the fair trial rule by the Supreme Court of the
United States has been criticized by its members 01 as well as by others,92
it is sufficiently well established to serve as a basis for solving the problem
now under discussion. Various formulations of. the rµle have been made,
but for present purposes it may be summarized as follows: Due process
of law in the trial of criminal cases does not require a state to observe
each of the requirements of the federal bill of rights, but it does require
a state to conduct the trial in accordance with "those canons of decency
and fairness which express the notions of justice of English speaking
peoples." 93 As Justice Frankfurter has said, in discussing the rule,
"It [ the due process cla}lse] expresses a demand for civilized
standards of law. It is thus not a stagnant formulation of what has
been achieved in the past but a standard for judgment in the progressive evolution of the institutions of a free society." o-1,
Examples of the rule's application are numerous. Perhaps the most
pertinent have to do with the institution of trial by jury. Although a
state may, apparently, deny an accused person a jury trial entirely, if
a jury trial is granted, the selection of the jury must be conducted in a
manner calculated to secure an impartiaJ. body from which no class of
persons has been arbitrarily excluded. Furthermore, the jury must be
00
It has apparently been established that the general right to vote is not a "privilege
or immunity'' of citizens of the United States, this right (as distinct from the right of
a qualified elector to vote for federal officials) being derived from the states and not from
the Federal Constitution. Minor v. Happerseft, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 162 (1875);
, Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 58 S.Ct. 205 (1937). Section 20 of the Criminal
Code, 18 U.S.C. (1946) § 52, however, makes it an offense for one, under color of
law, to deprive any inhabitant of a state of any right, privilege or immunity secured or
protected by the Constitution. This would reach and punish "state action" in violation .
of the Fourteenth Amendment when such action is through individuals. See Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945).
91
See dissenting opinion of Black, J., in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at
68, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
.
92
See Green, "The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment ~nd the Sup\-eme
Court," 46 M1cH. L. REv. 869 (1948).
93
Frankfurter, J., concurring 'in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 at 67,
67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
9
4, Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412 at 4i4, 65 S.Ct. 781 (1945) (concurring opinion).
'
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free from mob domination and must be allowed to reach a verdict
without being made subject to coercion. 95 In other words, trial by jury
means both more and less than a ritual before twelve men in a court
room. It must be characterized by the ·presence of those incidents which
historically have been recognized as substantial rather than merely
formal requisites of a fair proceeding.
On the same basis it should be concluded that even though a state
may abolish or limit the institution of popular election, and even though
it may determine the qualifications of electors, if it does permit elections
it must, in conducting them, as in the administration of the criminal law,
observe "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions
of justice of English speaking peoples." 96 If the principle of secret
voting as previously described can be regarded as a fundamental attribute
of popular elections, it should also be regarded as falling within the
protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
conclusion should follow even though serious questions may be raised
as to the possibility of protecting the liberty as a practical matter in view
of the fact that a state might avoid compliance simply by failing to provide
machinery for an election by ballot. Although there are instances· in
which obedience to the mandate of the court has been refused, 97 it should
not be presumed that in this day, the doctrine of nullification would be
adhered to by any state.
Admittedly, as was pointed out at the beginning of the discussion, 08
secret voting is not an ancient liberty which has come to us through the
traditional common law. However, the Fourteenth Amendment does
not extend its protection merely to those rights and liberties which have
existed for centuries. It also, to repeat the words of Justice Frankfurter,
constitutes "a standard for judgment in the progressive evolution of the
institutions of a free society."09 The comparative novelty of secret voting
in the sense of its universal recognition should not in itself prevent its
95
See Nutting, "The Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment and State
Criminal Cases," 3 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 244 at 251,252 (1936).
96
Supra, note 93.
97
Charles Warren found that seven states (Virginia, Ohio, Georgia, Kentucky,
South Carolina, California and Wisconsin) in the years between 1789 and 1860 denied
the constitutional right of the Supreme Court of the United States to decide cases on
writs of error to state courts. In some instances, notably that occurring in Georgia where
a defendant was executed as a result of a proceeding under an unconstitutional statute,
states have defied the mandate of the court. See Warren, "Legislative and Judicial
Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-A History of the Twenty-fifth
Section of the Judiciary Act," 47 AM. L. REv. l (1913).
98
Supra, p. 181.
99
Supra, p. 198.
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incorporation into the body of liberties enjoying constitutional protection.
As Justice Stone said in United States v. Classic,

" ... In determining whether a provision of the Constitution
applies to a new subject matter, it is of little significance that it is
one with which the framers were not familiar. For in setting up an
enduring framework of government they undertook to carry out
for the indefinite future and in all the vicissitudes of the changing
affairs of men, those fundamental purposes which the instrument
itself discloses. Hence we read its words, not as we read legislative
codes which are subject to continuous revision with the changing
course of events, but as the revelation of the great purposes which
were -:intended to be achieved by the Constitution as a continuing
instrument of government." 100
Clearly, the judgment of English speaking peoples, as expressed in
their constitutions, laws and judicial decisions, throughout the last half
. century, at least, has been that secrecy in voting is a fundamental element
of popular elections. It is secured by laws requiring such secrecy when
the vote is cast and by decisions and statutes granting the voter a privilege against compulsory disclosure thereafter. To make this judgment
still more effective through constitutional protection is but to recognize
the Constitution as "a continuing instrument of government" 101 and to
insure true freedom in the choice of those through whom the people rule.

II
POLITICAL INTERESTS, AFFILIATIONS
AND OPINIONS

A: Protection at Common Law
When Warren and Brandeis asserted in I 890 that the "common
law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to
what extent his thoughts, sentiments and emotions shall be communicated
to others," 102 they did so on the basis. that the. case law, properly considered, recognized and protected, though often by i11.direction, a "right
to privacy" which existed apart from other legally protected interests.
Since the publication of their epochal article, gradual and somewhat
grudging recognition has been accorded the view for which they conten1ed. However, the attention of students in the field has been confined
100

313 U.S ..299 at 316, 61 S.Ct. 1031 (1941).
Ibid.
102
Warren and Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," 4
(1890).
101

HARV.

L. REv. 193 at 198
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very largely to a consideration of the protection of the right in question
against intrusions by private persons.103 Today, the problem of determining the extent to which the Constitution of the United States guards
individuals from what Cooley has called "the prying eyes of the government" 104 has become equally important. The insatiable appetite-one
might almost say lust-for information on the part of public agencies
is evidenced by the multitude of reporting requirements imposed on
business.105 Legislation and legislative investigations designed to force
disclosures of political interests, affiliations and, perhaps ultimately of
opinions, appear to be multiplying, and these, particularly, raise serious
questions as to the permissible extent of governmental power.
At the outset, one may inquire whether as against the government
any "right" of privacy to the extent of affording effective protection
against the compulsory disclosure of information exists at all. It is
true, of course, that the Constitution protects individuals against selfincrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures. On the other
hand, by granting immunity from prosecution the government may force
the disclosure of otherwise incriminating evidence and the fact that one
may be exposed to public contempt or ridicule or be made subject to
various social and economic disadvantages is apparently regarded as
immaterial.1° 6 Furthermore, in connection with judicial proceedings
the government has wide powers to extort testimony from reluctant
witnesses, irrespective of the inconvenience, embarrassment or even
substantial detriment which they may suffer as a result.107 Modern
cases seem to extend a similar power to legislative investigating committees 108 as well as to administrative agencies exercising adjudicatory
and rule-making functions. 100 Although the power of compulsion in
103
See PROSSER, ToRTS 1050 et seq. (1941) for a discussion of the problem and
citations to the literature dealing with it from this point of view.
104
CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 7th ed., 425 (1903).
105
An idea of the extent of this burden is gained from the majority and dissenting
opinions in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375 (1948).
106
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S.Ct. 195 (1892); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370 (1906); Corwin, "The Supreme Court's Construction
of the Self-Incrimination Clause," 29 MICH. L. REV. 1, 191 (1930).
107
See generally, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed.,§ 2192 (1940).
108
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927); Jurney v.
MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 55 S.Ct. 375 (1935); Landis, "Constitutional Limitations
on the Congressional Power of Investigation," 40 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1926); Herwitz
and Mulligan, "The Legislative Investigating Committee," 33 CoL. L. REV. 4 (1933).
For a more thorough discussion of this matter, see infra, pp. 214-217.
109
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S.Ct. u25
(1894); Attorney General v. Brissenden, 271 Mass. 172, 171 N.E. 82 (1930). See
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 63 S.Ct. 339 (1943).
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legislative and administrative inquiries is probably limited by the requirement of pertinence 110 this restriction seems not to apply in judicial
proceedings,111 and in any event has virtually no effect so far as safeguarding the privacy of the witness is concerned, since that which is
most relevant may also be that which the witness most wishes to conceal.
The limited protection given confidential communications of one sort
or another may constitute recognition of the right of privacy, but the
witness probably is not entitled to constitutional protection in such cases.112
Nevertheless, it is suggested that the scope of governmental inquiry
may not be as wide as the statements made in the preceding paragraph
would appear to indicate. Although the very obviousness of the assertion
makes documentation difficult, this discussion is predicated on the proposition that normally the individual is entitled to a privilege against
compulsory disclosure of any .fact, belief or opinion which he chooses ·
to conceal unless some countervailing social interest makes disclosure
desirable. 118 Society's need to know must be balanced against the individual's interest in keeping silent and where the former is lacking, the
latter should prevail. In spite of broad language such as Wigmore's
assertion: "For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a
110
This is clearly true in the case of legislative investigations, in the sense that the
questions asked must be reasonably pertinent to the inquiry, which, in turn, must have
a reasonable connection with a matter as to which legislation may constitutionally be
enacted. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927). The same rule
applies as to administrative investigations. See Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S.Ct. u25 (1894), and see infra, pp. 214-216.
111
A witness in a judicii!l proceeding probably has no right to refuse to answer
irrelevant questions. See I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 7 (1940).
112
As far as state cases are concerned, it appears that even the privilege against selfincrimination may be denied without violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Twining v. New Jersey, 2II U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947) A fortiori it would seem that privileges
relating to the disclosure of confidential communications could be limited or abolished.
In view of the generally admitted power of state legislatures to alter rules of evidence
[see I W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 7 (1940)] it would appear that the Congress
could, if it chose, act in a similar manner with respect to litigation in the federal courts,
although in the absence of such legislation, these courts will decide such matters on the
basis of common law principles. Wolfie v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 54S.Ct. 279 (1934).
113
This point of view finds its clearest expression in cases dealing with the investigatory power of the government. Thus, in Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 at
292, 49 S.Ct. 4 7 I ( I 928), the "right" to be exempt from unreasonable compulsion to
disclose personal and private affairs is said to be of the greatest importance. See also
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 at 478, 14 S.Ct. II25
(1894). In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 639,
640, 63 S.Ct. n78 (1943), Mr. Justice Jackson, in referring to "the majestic
generalities of the Bill of Rights," calls attention to the fact that the principles which
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fundamental maxim that the public ... has a right to every man's evidence" 114 it is believed that in situations where compulsory disclosure
has been upheld, a social interest in the disclosure sufficient to overcome
the individual interest in silence is demonstrable.
In judicial proceedings, such as Wigmore had in mind in making the
statement just quoted, the social interest in the just solution of controversies through complete disclosure of the facts is apparent. Where
legislative investigations are involved, the desirability of obtaining all
pertinent evidence is equally clear. On the other hand, circumstances
may exist in. which nondisclosure may be protected either because the
social interest in the information is not sufficiently evident or because
compulsion would defeat some other interest which it is more important
to safeguard. An example of the latter situation is found in connection
with voting for candidates for public office where, as was pointed out
above, protection of the secrecy of the ballot is regarded as necessary in
order to maintain the purity of elections.115 Whether such protection
is afforded by the Constitution of the United States to other forms of
political activity should now be considered. But since, for reasons to be
pointed out, the protection, if it exists, is narrowly limited, it seems best
to define the area by dealing first with the permissible scope of compulsory disclosure, and then determining what freedom of silence remains.
they declare "grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the
center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental
restraints, and that government should be entrusted with few controls and only the
mildest supervision over men's affairs." Although he states that the principle of noninterference has "withered at least as to economic affairs" the inference seems clear
that it still has vitality when interference with political freedom is concerned. In the case
under discussion, the right to keep silent was affirmed but here the government did not
seek merely to compel the disclosure of information but rather to compel affirmation of
a belief contrary to the religious principles of the persons involved. Hence, the decision
cannot be regarded as direct authority for the proposition that silence is generally
privileged. In Wallace v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry., 94 Ga. 732, 22 S.E. 579 (1894), the
Georgia Court of Appeals, in invalidating a law requiring railway companies to state
in writing the grounds of discharge of employees, said (id. at 732): "Liberty of speech
and of writing is secured by the constitution, and incident thereto is the correlative liberty
of silence, not less important nor less sacred." The writer does not suggest, however,
that the two "freedoms" are completely co-extensive, for, as will appear later, disclosure
may be compelled with reference to situations where speech could not be forbidden.
However, there is an obvious affinity between freedom of silence and freedom of speech
which would seem to justify, with respect to the former, the same refusal to permit
"dubious intrusions" which is evidenced by the court where the latter freedom is involved.
Cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 530, 65 S.Ct. 315 (1945).
114
8 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2192 (1940).
115
Supra, pp. 187-188.
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B. Scope of Compulsory Disclosure in Connection
with Elections
Perhaps the clearest cases in which disclosure may be required are
found in coruiection with the choice of public officials. The social interest
in honest elections, which justifies the constitutional protection of secret
voting, may also a:fford the basis for compelling disclosure, since in some
circumstances publicity rather than concealment is necessary in order to
attain the desired result. This is particularly true in connection with
campaign expenditures.
One of the usual·features of corrupt practice legislation is the requirement that candidates file reports showing their campaign expenditures
and indicating the sources from which contributions have been obtained.116
Provisions of this sort are designed to deal with the problem of limiting
the size of -campaign expenditures through publicity, apparently in the
hope that unfavorable public reaction to excessive spending will result
in reducing the amounts used to influence elections.117 It has also been
suggested that publicity of this sort will enable voters to know the
character of the influences being exerted on behalf of candidates for
·office.118 In addition, where a limitation on expenditures has been imposed, the reporting requirement serves as a means of discovering
violations of the law.119
The constitutionality of requirements of this character seems obvious
in spite of the fact that they admittedly force the disclosure of matters
which the candidates and their supporters may wish to conceal. The
relationship between publicity as to expenditures and honest elections
can scarcely be questioned, and there seems to have been no attempt to
invoke constitutional protection in this area except to the extent that
state constitutional provisions involving considerations other than those
here under discussion have been present.120 Although some courts have
been inclined to be less than vigorous in their enforcement of these
116
Requirements of this kind have been imposed by the legislatures of almost all of
the states and by the federal government. See BEST, CORRUPT PRACTICES AT ELECTIONS
(1937). The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Viet., c. 51
contains similar provisions. For an account of the development of corrupt practice
legislation see Hutchinson, "Corrupt Practices Acts," 27 AM. L. REv. 345 (1893).
117
Lederle, "Political Committee Expenditures and the Hatch Act," 44 MICH.
L. REV. 294 (1945).
118
See Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423, 109 S.W. (2d) 826 (1937); La Belle
v. Hennepin Co. Bar Assn., 206 Minn. 290, 288 N.W. 788 (1939).
119
See Healy v. State, u5 Md. 377, 80 A. 1074 (1911); Maher v. Jahnel, 73
N.D. 742, 19N.W. (2d) 453 (1945).
120
Thus, in State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler, 200 Wis. 518, 228 N.W. 895
(1930), noted in 29 MICH. L. REv. 228 (1930), it was contended unsuccessfully that
the requirement was invalid as imposing a qualification for office in addition to those
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provisions 121 and although the practicality of the publicity device is
questionable,122 state litigation in the area has not raised questions of
federal constitutional law,1 23 while the power of the national government
to require disclosure of such matters in connection with federal elections
has been sustained.124
Somewhat more difficulty has been encountered with another phase of
the problem, however. In addition to requiring the reporting of expenditures, corrupt practice legislation rather frequently contains provisions
requiring disclosures in connection with the publication of campaign
literature. Typically, these provisions require that political advertisements and circulars contain the name of the candidate on whose behalf
they are circulated and the names of any other persons, such as committee
chairmen, who are responsible for the publication.125 They are obviously
designed to prevent the circulation of irresponsible and often defamatory
comment and to identify the interests involved in the campaign. Although the most rudimentary conception of honesty would seem to call
for disclosures of this character, such laws have been attacked as violative
of the right of free speech, apparently on the theory that freedom will be
unduly restricted unless anonymity is preserved. However, as the Ohio
court has held,126 requiring disclosures of the sort under consideration
cannot properly be regarded as unduly restricting freedom of speech but
is rather to be viewed as a device to fix responsibility for the abuse of the
right. In addition, it may be said that the public is entitled to know the
identity of those who disseminate political literature so that the weight
enumerated in the state constitution. In Creech v. Fields, 276 Ky. 359, 124 S.W.
(2d) 503 (1939), a provision that the office should be awarded to the non-guilty
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes if the winning candidate had been
guilty of failure to file a statement of expenses was held unconstitutional as applied to
general elections (although not to primaries) in view of the requirement that elections
should be determined by the plurality vote of the people.
121
Most courts have taken the position that substantial compliance with the statutory
requirement is sufficient and appear to have been quite lenient in determining that
substantial compliance existed. See Land v. Clark, 132 Cal. 673, 64 P. 1071 (1901);
Englebert v. Tuttle, 185 Minn. 608, 242 N.W. 425 (1932); State ex rel. Pelishek v.
Washburn, 223 Wis. 595, 270 N.W. 541 (1937); Effertz v. Schimelpfenig, 207 Minn.
324, 291 N.W. 286 (1940).
122
See Lederle, "Political Committee Expenditures and the Hatch Act," 44M1cH. L. REv. 294 (1945).
128
An examination of the cases, including those cited supra, notes 1 8 and I 9 fails
to reveal any claim that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or any other
provision of the Federal Constitution is violated by state legislation requiring the filing of
statements of campaign expenditures.
124
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 54 S.Ct. 287 (1934).
125
Twenty-two states appear to have enacted such provisions. See BEST, CORRUPT
PRACTICES AT ELECTIONS ( 193 7).
126
State v. Babst, 104 Ohio 167, 135 N.E. 525 (1922).

206

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

to be given the statements contained in it may be judged in th~ light of
the interest of the persons making them. The reasonable character of
the requirement in view of the public interest involved when balanced
against the relatively trivial character of the restriction should obviate
any possibility of successful attack under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.127
As a part of the general legislative. campaign to "outlaw" or curtail
the activities of the Communist Party and so-called communist-front or
foreign-controlled organizations 128 attempts to force the disclosure of
the identity of individuals engaging in political activity through groups
of this nature have been made. Aside from the requirement that such
organizations register with a public authority and, as a part of the registration, disclose the names of their officers and members, a California law
has provided that literature emanating from the organizations shall be
identified by the name of the organization together with the names and
addresses of its officers.129 The Subversive Activities Control Bill, passed
by the United States House of Representatives on May 19, 1948, contains a registration requirement applicable to "communist organizations"
as defined in the bill, and also provides that literature disseminated
through the instrumentalities of interstate commerce by such groups
must bear the name of the group and the statement that it is a "communist
organization." 130
In general, it would seem to be within the power of the states and the
federal government to require disclosures of this nature. As far as the
latter government is concerned, the legislation in part appears to fall
within the principle recognized in connection with the Public Utility
Holding Company Act 181 that the use of the mails and other instrumen127
The result may be different when the peculiar provisions of state constitutions are
considered. In Ex parte Harrison, 212 Mo. 88, IIO S.W. 709 (1908), a requirement
that civic leagues, in making reports on candidates, publish the facts on which the reports
were based as well as the names and addresses of persons furnishing the information, was
held to constitute an "impairment" of free speech violative of the Missouri Constitution
since compliance with the requirement occasioned additional ~xpense. Certain provisions
of the Pennsylvania Constitution were held to be violated by a statute relating to the
anonymous publication of defamatory matter in connection with elections in Commonwealth v. Rentschler, (Berks Co. 1901) 26 Pa. C.C. 39.
128
See Groner, "State Control of Subversive Activities in the United States," 9
F.B.A.J. 61 (1947); 96 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 381 (1948).
129
California Subversive Organization Registration Law, Cal. Penal Code (Deering,
1947 Supp.) Appx., p. 179, enacted in 1947.
180
R.R. 5852, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948).
181 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Tit. I, § 5, 49 Stat. L. 803 at
812 (1935), 15 U.S.C. (1946) § 79e.
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talities of interstate commerce can be conditioned upon the disclosure of
relevant information when desirable in the public interest.132 Further
than this, the precedent of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,
as amended, would seem to be applical;>le if the organizations subject to
the registration requirement can be said to be foreign controlled.188
In the case of state legislation, the requirement would appear to be consistent with due process if applied to all political literature for the reasons
indicated in the foregoing discussion of political advertisements and
circulars. The public interest may clearly be served by requiring full
information as to the identity of those seeking to influence political action
in order that their connections and probable motives may be revealed.
However, the fact that the Communist Party and organizations said
to be allied with it are singled· out for special treatment in this connection
may raise a problem, as to state legislation, under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the question as to whether
the legislative classification is appropriate must be decided by the courts.
If the legislature has created and clearly defined a "real class," that is,
if it has acted in a situation where there are sufficient factual distinctions
to make the selection and regulation of organizations of this kind reasonable, the requirements of equal protection have been satisfied.134 Some
indication as to whether or not this is the case may be gained from what
the legislature has said. The California act contains a statement that
the law "is enacted in the exercise of the police power of this State for
the protection of the public peace and safety...." 185 Legislative declarations of policy and findings of fact are often entitled to considerable
weight. 186 However, since the exercise of civil rights is at least indirectly
182

Electric Bond and Share Co. v. Securities Exchange Commission, 303 U.S.

419, 58 S.Ct. 678 (1938).
183

Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 52 Stat. L. 631 (1938), as amended,
53 Stat. L. 1244 (1939), 56 Stat. L. 251 (1942), 60 Stat. L. 1352, zz U.S.C.A.
(Supp. 1947) § 61 I et seq.
184
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 44 S.Ct. 325 (1924); Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141, 60 S.Ct. 879 (1940); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
57 S.Ct. 578 (1937); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 1,97, 44 S.Ct. 15 (1923); Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. zoo, 47 S.Ct. 584 (1927). Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110 (1942); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct.
269 (1948).
m Cal. Penal Code (Deering, 1941) Appx., p. 179, § 35,000 (1947).
186
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 5oz, 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934); Mulford v.
Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 59 S.Ct. 648 (1939); United States v. Rock-Royal Cooperative,
307 U.S. 533, 59 S.Ct. 993 (1939); Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States,
263 U.S. 456, 44 S.Ct. 169 (1924); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 41 S.Ct. 458
(1921); HORACK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 667 (1940).
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involved, it is probable that the Supreme Court of the United States will
wish to determine the appropriateness of the classification independently
in any case which may come before it.137 The sketchy and formal character of the declaration by the California legislature is not, in any event,
particularly helpful in furnishing a factual justification for the measure.
Whether or not the activities of the groups in question present a sufficiently serious threat to the safety of ~he government to justify special
treatment may be a debatable matter.138 The validity of legislation of
the type in question being peculiarly dependent on a full consideration
of the facts involved,139 speculat~on as to the result in advance of a
decision is of no particular value.
Since the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause 140
the validity of federal legislation on the subject would not be susceptible
to precisely the same type of attack. The only question would seem to
137
The Supreme Court, in language equally applicable to free speech, has clearly
indicated this where restraints on freedom of religion raising questions under the due
process clause were involved. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943). In scrutinizing state criminal procedure, the
court has formed its independent judgment in. deciding whether due process has been
denied by the action of state courts, and here also, the language is applicable to cases
involving the denial of any "federal right." Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct.
265 (1923); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579 (1935).
138
In Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. I 18, 63 S.Ct. · 1333 (1943), a
denaturalization proceeding, the majority of the court took the position that the government had not offered sufficiently convincing proof that the Communist Party advocated
the violent overthrow of government. This, of course, does not amount to a decision that
such proof cannot be advanced. However, formal statements of the Communist Party
of the United States, for what they are worth, specifically forbid action by party members
directed toward the use of violence. See 48 CoL. L. REv. 253 at 261 (1948). Thus, if
the contrary co11clusion is to be reached, it must be through evidence of a more indirect
character.
189
Cf. Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 55 S.Ct. 187
( 1934); Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251, 56 S.Ct. 453 (1936);
Wilson, "Consideration of Facts in Constitutional Cases," 17 So. CAL. L. REv. 335

(1944).
140

Whether or not the absence of such a clause makes any practical difference is
doubtful. Although it was stated in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124
. (1921), that the protections offered by the equal protection and due process clauses are
not "co-terminous" it would_ seem that unreasonable discrimination would be violative
of both clauses of the Fourteenth, and hence also violative of the Fifth, Amendment.
Although no cases have qeen found in which federal legislation has been invalidated
by the Supreme Court because of unreasonable classification, there are some intimations
that the court might do so if it were found to exist. See United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 at 99-101, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S.
I at 14, 59 S.Ct. 379 (1939).
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be one of due process. However, even here, the reasonableness of
selecting particular organizations for the purpose of imposing the registration and designation requirements would be relevant and subject to
the same general considerations as those just stated. In this connection
it should be noted that the -Subversive Activities Control Bill contains
a carefully drawn statement of legislative findings which would be of
assistance to the court in sustaining the registration and related requirements if other more questionable portions of the measure are upheld.141

C. Compulsory Disclosure in Connection with Lobbying
The matters previously discussed relate principally, although not
exclusively, to situations involving the choice of representatives through
the process of popular election. Similar problems arise in connection with
activities designed to influence legislative action on particular measures.
Under the American system of representative government, particularly
in modern times, legislation is frequently the product of organized influence exerted by pressure groups acting either en masse, through letters,
telegrams, picketing or similar devices, or through spokesmen unflatteringly designated as lobbyists. Bentley has said:
" ... We find in countries like the United States a limitless
number of reform organizations and special-interest organizations
of unending variety. They will range all the way from those which
claim to be purely motivated by public spirit to those which do not
even attempt to disguise rank selfishness, but each and every one
of them is an interest organization of a representative character." 142
Whether this state of affairs is regarded with horror,143 complacency 144 or resignation 145 it must still be viewed as an inevitable part
141

A discussion of other features of the bill is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, the vagueness of the statutory definitions and the wide discretion of the
Attorney General in connection with the designation of communist front organizations
offer interesting possibilities for attack if the measure should become law.
142
BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GovE~NMENT, Principia Press ed., 431 (1935).
143
In speaking of the activities of the Public Utility lobby, Representative Rankin
said: "Officials have been corrupted, elections bought or stolen, legislatures have been
dominated, Governors have been controlled, Senators have been influenced, Congressmen
intimidated, and the President threatened by this consciousless [sic], corrupt supergovernment, this insatiable octopus.••." 79 CoNG. REc. u250 (1935).
144
See Bellows, "In Defense of Lobbying," 172 HARPER'S MAGAZINE 96 (1935).
145
See BLAISDELL, EcoNoMIC PowER AND PoLITICAL PRESSURES, T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 26, 48 (1941), where it is said that President Franklin Roosevelt referred to
the sum of all interest groups as "what we mean by American Democracy."
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of the legislative process in the light of the present scope and function of
law making.146
However, recognition of this fact does not involve acceptance of
the abuses which may accompany the activities of special interest groups.
To the extent that they involve corruption in its crasser forms, such as
bribery and blackmail, they are clearly subject to restraint. But modern .
practice is not characterized by such crudity. More insidious means of
influencing legislative action are today much more common and much
more dangerous than those used by the "Black Horse Cavalry" of an
earlier era. 147 In part, at least, these methods involve the concealment
of the true interest of those who attempt to secure the enactment of
favorable laws through personal influence and secret solicitation. ·
It is for this reason that the publicity device has come to be the means
most commonly used to control lobbying. In one form or another
twenty-two states 148 and the federal government 149 have attempted to
bring to light the interests and connections of the lobbyist. Typically,
laws of the type in question require lobbyists, that is, persons hired to
influence legislation, to regfster with a designated official and to state the
names of their employers as w~ll as to indicate the legislation which they
have been retained to promote or to oppose. Employers of lobbyists also
are often required to register. In many instances, the filing of expense
accounts stating the amount of money spent and naming those who
received it is required.
Such legislation, it will be noted, does not attempt to distinguish
between "good" and "bad" lobbying. It is of course true that the lobbyist,
whether professional or amateur, may be a useful adjunct to the legislative process, since he may help members of the legislature to learn the
facts in controversy or to become better informed of the views of their
constituents. In situations of this sort, the lobbyist occupies a position not
unlike that of the lawyer in presenting a case before a court. He is
obviously nbt impartial but his efforts may be of real assistance in the
development of wise laws. Be this as it may, such considerations have
146

See Beutel, "The Pressure of Organized Interests as a Factor in Shaping Legislation," 3 So. CAL. L. REv. IO (1929); passim, 179 ANNALS (1935), containing a
collection of articles on the organization and techniques of pressure groups.
147 The differences are pointed out in an article on the Lobby, N.Y. TIMES,
January 28, 1934.
148
The legislation is collected in 47 CoL. L. REv. 98 at 99-102 (1947).
149
Title III of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. ·L. 839 et seq.,
2 U.S.C.A. (1946) § 261 et seq•.
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not generally induced the law makers to discriminate as far as registration
requirements are concerned.
·
The problem, then, is whether any lobbyist, "good" or "bad" is
constitutionally entitled to freedom of silence when he is required to
reveal the nature of his interest in pending legislation and to show what
he has received and spent in support of his cause. Basically, the question
raised is whether or not the forcing of such disclosures can be regarded
as violative of due process as constituting a substantial interference with
the right of every citizen to speak on political questions or to petition the
legislature for a redress of grievances.
The constitutionality of existing acts controlling lobbying through
the registration device seems not to have been questioned and for this
reason no direct authority can be cited which bears on the matter. However, certain problems are suggested when the question is considered in
the light of what has been said in the foregoing discussion. If it be
granted that, in general, silence is privileged, the requirement of disclosure here, as in other cases, must be justified on the basis of the social
interest involved. Clearly, the right to speak on political questions and
the allied right to petition, both of which are protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, are basic under the traditional American view
of constitutional government. 150 Legislation curtailing the exercise of
these rights or affecting allied interests is constquently suspect.
On the other hand, as has been indicated, protection of the elective
and legislative processes from corruption has been recognized as legitimate and necessary. It would seem equally clear that in the carrying out
of legislative functions the lawmakers should be permitted to obtain
information which is needed for the purpose of according proper weight
to the views of those seeking or opposing the enactment of particular
measures. To require disclosures sufficient for the purpose seems consistent with even the most zealous desire to protect free speech.
Regulatory legislation in this field has generally been confined to
those situations in which compulsory disclosures are clearly related to the
possible corruption of legislators through bribery or secret infl.uence.151
150 Although the Supreme Court has indicated this to be true on numerous occasions,
one of the clearest expositions of the fundamental character of such liberties is found in
Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943). Freedom of religion was the liberty directly
involved, but the statement of principle is equally applicable to freedom of speech.
See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315 (1945).
151 Generally, as has been stated, the legislation deals with the hired lobbyist and,
to some extent, with his employer. See 47 CoL. L. REv. 98 (1947).
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The right to speak has been conditioned upon compliance with registration requirements, the filing of expense accounts, and in some instances
upon observance of restrictions as to the places in which lobbying may
be carried on. To the extent that the legislation is so limited it seems
clearly to fall within the principles relied upon to sustain corrupt practice
legislation in general.152
However, conventional anti-lobbying legislation does not reach the
heart of the problem. The most significant activities of pressure groups
today involve not personal solicitation but rather indirect types of influence through publicity campaigns and synthetic demonstrations of one
sort or another. Telegrams and letters to congressmen, marches on
Washington and inspired newspaper comment are the tools of the modern
trade.153 The use of these devices is practically unaffected by laws currently in force. Whether it is constitutionally permissible to impose
restrictions of any sort on the activities just mentioned requires further
consideration.
To state the problem is to emphasize the difficulty of its solution.
If legislation were adopted which would substantially curtail the right
of addressing Congress or state legislatures, it would almost certainly
be regarded as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and
would also constitute an undesirable interference with the channels of
communication between legislators and their constituents. Furthermore
restrictions in this area would lack the basis which has been suggested for
sustaining the usual anti-lobbying laws since the corruption of legislators
would not be involved.
It would seem, however, that any measures designed simply to
identify those who seek to influence legislation through the use of pressure would constitute lawful conditions upon the rights of free speech
and petition. The disclosures required would aid rather than retard the
legislative process and would tend to promote law making more fully in
accord with the public interest. The only effect so far as the individual is
concerned would be to deprive him of an anonymity of which, from the
standpoint of good government, he should not be entitled. Thus, it would
seem appropriate to require that petitions or other communications addressed to the legislature bear the correct names and addresses of the
signers and that persons soliciting others to send communications be
required to state as a matter of public record that they have done so,
152

Supra, pp. 204-205.

153

See BLAISDELL, EcoNOMic PowER AND

graph No. 26, p. 48 (1941).
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perhaps also indicating the amount of money expended in connection with
the activity.154 Legislation of this sort, coupled with that which has been
enacted, if properly drawn and appropriately enforced, would deal with
the problem of pressure groups in a realistic but not unduly restrictive
manner.155
Thus far the discussion has, it is believed, established the following
conclusions: Governmental intrusions upon freedom of silence through
requiring compulsory disclosures may be permissible when they amount
in substance to conditions imposed upon politlcal activity in connection
with the elective or the legislative process.156 However, such intrusions
must be reasonable and in addition must be reasonably calculated to
advance a demonstrable social interest in the field in which they are
imposed. Such an interest exists in the prevention ,of corruption and
other forms of dishonesty in connection with elections and legislation.
It may also be found in measures designed to secure for legislators full
information as to the interest and affiliations of persons attempting to
influence legislation. 157 Laws compelling disclosures in such circumstances must, however, be sufficiently nondiscriminatory to satisfy the
constitutional requirements of equal protection and due process.

D. Scope of Compulsory Disclosure Before Congressional
Investigating Committees
Probably the most difficult and also the most controversial questions
involving freedom of silence in political affairs are connected with the
work of congressional investigating committees. The Un-American
154

Id. 194. Some attempt has been made to require newspaper publishers to report
the receipt of money paid for the purpose of printing articles advocating or opposing
pending legislation. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 34-306; Wis. Stat. (1945)
§ 346.295. The federal act states that it applies to persons who receive money to be
used principally to aid in the passage or defeat of legislation by Congress or to influence
the defeat or passage of such legislation. 60 Stat. L. 841 (1946), 2 U.S.C.A. (1947)
§ 266.
155
This is substantially the course advocated by the President's Committee on
Civil Rights; see the report of that Committee at p. 164 (1947).
156
The term "legislative process" as here used would include at least the rule
making activities of administrative agencies. See 49 Stat. L. 803 at 823 (1935), 15
U.S.C. (1946) § 79l(i); 49 Stat. L. 1985 at 2014 (1936), 52 Stat. L. 553 at 963
(1938), 46 U.S.C. (1946) § 1225, imposing registration and accounting requirements
on certain lobbyists appearing before the Securities Exchange Commission and the
Maritime Commission, respectively. See also, 47 CoL. L. REv. 98 at 103 (1947).
157
A related problem, which is outside the scope of the present discussion, has to
do with the so-called "Non-Communist Affidavit" provision of § 9 (h) of the TaftHartley Act, 61 Stat. L. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. 1947) § 159 (h). This
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Activities Committee of the House of Representatives 158 has, during the
course of its investigations,159 created issues of paramount importance in
the area of conflict between individual demands for privacy and governmental insistence upon disclosure. A dispassionate attempt to describe
the extent of the investigatory power to compel revelations of political
affiliations and beliefs is thus of both current and permanent importance.
To assert that legislatiye investigating committees, like other agencies of the government, are subject to the rule of law is to state a conclusion which, though obvious, may not be entirely true. Of course, as is
evidern;ed by many cases, the activities of such groups are subject to
judicial review 169 but the effectiveness of this process in terms of affording
protection to individual citizens may well be subject to question. The
legislative power to investigate and by necessary implication to punish
persons called as witnesses for contumnacious refusal to testify is beyond
dispute. 161 However, it is also apparent that there are certain ostensible
limitations on the power, the character of whiGh it is necessary to consider.
First among these, and one which is recognized either by way of
holding 162 or dictum 168 in virtually all of the cases, is what may be
called the limitation of pertinence. Although it has been suggested that
inyestigating committees should be allowed free scope of inquiry merely
section is designed to force communists out of controlling positions in labor unions rather
than affirmatively to require disclosure of Communist affiliations. However, the constitutionality of the provision is dependent on considerations similar to those involved
in determining the validity of the Subversive Activities Control Bill, H.R. 58 52,
80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948) discussed supra, pp. 206-209. See 48 CoL. L. REV. 253
(1948).
•
158
For a description of the history and function of the committee see 47 CoL.
L. REV. 416 (1947).
.
159
The methods and practices of the committee have been subjected to strenuous
attacks, among the most devastating and convincing of which is Gellhorn, "Report on a
Report of the House Committee.on Un-American Activities," 60 HARV. L. REv. II93
(1947). See OGDEN, THE Drns CoMMITTEE, 2d ed. (1945); Letter to the President
by Meml,,ers of the Yale Faculty of Law, 34 A.B.A.J. 15 (1948).
160
See the cases cited infra, notes 162 and 163.
161
There are, of course, many decisions to this effect. The modern doctrine with
respect to the power of congressional investigating committees stems from McGrain
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927). The decision in this case was
probably influenced by Landis, "Constitutional Limitations on tl_ie Congressional Power
of Investigation," 40 HARV. L. REv. 153 (1926). For an exhaustive consideration of
the same problem with respect to the ?tates, see Herwitz and Mulligan, "The Legislative
Investigating Committee," 33 CoL. L. REv. 4 (1933).
162
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
168
For example, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927);
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 49 S.Ct. 268 (1929); Jurney v. MacCracken,
294 U.S. 125, 55 S.Ct. 375 (1935).
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in order to publicize events which may be of interest to the electorate,164
the Supreme Court of the United States has not evinced enthusiasm _for
. legislative field days of this character. Rather, the Court has stated:
"It has always been recognized in this country, and it is well
to remember, that few if any of the rights of the people guarded
by fundamental law are of greater importance to their happiness
and safety than the right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary or unreasonable inquiries and disclosures in respect of their
personal and private affairs." 165
The presence of five qualifying words in the single sentence quoted
raises some doubt as to the scope of protection afforded, but somewhat
more concrete information is furnished by Mr. Justice Van Devanter
who, in speaking for the Court in McGrain v. Daugherty said: " ... it is
a necessary deduction from the decisions in Kilbourn v. Thompson and
In re Chapman that a witness rightfully may refuse to answer where
the bounds of the [investigatory] power are exceeded or the questions
are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry." 166
That these words are of cold comfort to those wishing to avoid the
duty of testifying before investigating committees is evidenced by th·e
unanimity with which the cases decided after the McGrain opinion was
handed down uphold the power of the committees to compel testimony.
Although in theory the refusal to testify in response to questions not
pertinent to possible legislation cannot be punished, there seems to be
no effective way in which lack of relevance can be established. It is not
necessary for Congress in creating an investigating com~ittee to specify
that particular or, indeed, any legislation is expected to result from the
inquiry.167 The fact that legislation has not been forthcoming as a result
of previous activities of the committee appears to have no significance.168
164

See McGEARY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CoNGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIVE
PoWER 104 ( I 940) ; Herwitz and Mulligan, "The Legislative Investigating Committee,"
33 CoL. L. REv. 4 at 6 (1933). This is also apparently the view of Ehrmann, "The
Duty of Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation," I I UNIV. CHI. L. REv. I (1943);
id. 117 (1944). Cf. his comment (id. 153): "The European experience shows conclusively that where facts can be ascertained only by a curtailment of the citizen's
individual freedom there should be no hesitation in paying that price, lest the freedom
of all be endangered."
165
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 at 292, 49 S.Ct. 263 (1929). Emphasis
supplied.
166
273 U.S. 135 at 176, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927).
167
McGrain v. Daugherty, ibid.
168
Townsend v. United States, (App. D.C. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 352.
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The possibility that some legislation, whether constitutionally valid or
not, may result seems to be sufficient to justify the investigation.169 Thus
there appears to be no practical way in which an unwilling witness can
challenge the investigation, or, perhaps, successfully object to any par-•
ticular question on the sole ground that the inquiry or the question is not
pertinent to the range of the committee's power.
This is not to suggest that the cases lack a basis in reason. Clearly,
it may be impossible to tell in advance whether legislation. should be
enacted after the facts have been discovered, much less to describe with
particularity the laws which will be passed. To require.specification in
such detail would be to render useless the investigatory power, which is
universally conceded to be a necessary adjunct to wise legislation. However, when this is said it should be realized that the so-called limitation
of pertinence has been reduced to almost complete insignificance and
that if any protection is to be accorded witnesses it must be placed on
some other theory.
Another possible limitation is found in the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination, which is almost certainly available to witnesses
before investigating committees.170 But it is possible to defeat this restriction by a sufficiently.broad grant of immunity 171 even though the results
of answering a question under such conditions may be disastrous to the
witness involved. The protection may, however, have some practical
significance since the immunity presently granted is of doubtful validity
and apparently Congress is unwilling either to extend immunity to the
degree which, under the doctrine of Hale v. H enkel 112 would be neces169

Barsky v. United States, (App. D.C. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241.
547, 12 S.Ct. 195 (1892), indicated that
the privilege extended to witnesses in investigations conducted under the authority of
the Interstate Commerce Act, and Congress has apparently recognized that the principle
expressed in the case is applicable generally to administrative rule-making procedings.
Cf. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644 (1896). There seems to be no serious
contention that the same restrictions would not apply to legislative committees, although
the existing grant of immunity provided in connection with testimony before them is,
perhaps, not sufficiently broad. See infra, note 7 I.
171
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370 (1906).
172
Ibid. The present provision is to the effect that no testimony given by a witness
before a congressional committee shall be "used as evidence in any criminal proceeding
against him in any court." Rev. Stat. ( 1878) § 859, as amended 52 Stat. L. 943 (1938),
28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1947) § 634. It is said that uncertainty as to whether the grant of
immunity is sufficiently broad has led to a practice on the part of investigating committees
not to press the demand for testimony of this character. Ehrmann, "The Duty of
Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation," I I UNiv. Cm. L. REv. I at 20 (1943).

° Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
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sary,173 or to test the matter in the courts. On the other hand, there are
many situations in which the disclosure of matters of the sort under
consideration would clearly involve no element of criminality and in
such cases, of course, the privilege would offer no protection.174
The constitutional prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures
has some bearing on the problem since, in cases involving the activities
of administrative agencies, the issuance of unreasonably broad subpoenas
duces tecum has been held to violate the provision.175 This point has
been raised in recent cases dealing with the production of books and
records before the Un-American Activities Committee with inconclusive
results. In United States v. Josephson 176 the court regarded the question
of whether or not the subpoena was lawful as immaterial in view of the
fact that the witness refused to be sworn or to testify at all. In United
States v. Bryan,177 which was decided on a motion to dismiss the indictments, the. court declined to rule on the question of the legality of the
subpoenas, holding that the matter could be determined only at a trial on
the facts. The opinion indicates, however, that the subpoenas were not
susceptible to attack as being violative of the Fourth Amendment.178
Whether or not the subpoenas in these cases were valid, it seems clear
that the problem does not involve the basic power of the committee to
compel disclosure of the information sought, but rather concerns the
specificity with which its demands must be stated.
173
It has been held, however, that the statute (supra, note 172) which provides
that testimony shall not be used except in prosecutions for perjury in connection with
giving it does not prevent the use of such testimony in a contempt proceeding. United
States v. Barsky, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 165.
174
Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 37 S.Ct. 621 (1917), holding that
whether a question is incriminating is for the court and 1,1ot for the witness to decide.
If Communist affiliations are not criminal it would seem that the privilege would not
prevent compulsory disclosure of such affiliations.
175
Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 44 S.Ct.
336 (1924). See Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 at 209, 66 S.Ct. 494
(1946).
176
(C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82.
177
(D.C. D.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 58.
178
The subpoenas involved in this case were extremely broad. One required the
witness to produce "all books, records, papers and documents showing all the receipts and
disbursements of money by the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc.,
and all correspondence, memoranda and communications with any and all persons,
together with a complete list of all affiliated organizations for the year 1945." Id. at
60. The court said, however, that "somewhat similar subpoenas" had been held valid in
other cases, which were cited. Id. at 64. At least one commentator has been greatly
disturbed by the breadth of the subpoenas used by the committee. 14 UNiv. CHI.
L. REv. 256 at 261 (1947).
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The argument most strenuously advanced by those resisting compulsory disclosures of political affiliations is that the guaranty of free
speech provided by the First Amendment is somehow being violated by
such intrusions on privacy. In part, the contention seems to be based on
the assumption that freedom of silence with respect to political affairs
is completely correlative to freedom of speech, so that one cannot be
compelled to speak with respect to matters as to which his speech cannot
constitutionally be restricted. Therefore, it is argued, since political
speech cannot be restrained unless it constitutes a clear and present danger
to government,179 it cannot be compelled unless silence creates a similar
danger.180
Such a mechanical interpretation of the First Amendment seems
completely unjustified. Although,the point was not directly ruled upon
in the Barsky case 181 the court pointed out that the policy exemplified by
the First Amendment is one of furthering the safety ( and, it might be
added, orderly change) of qemocratic government through free discussion of doctrines of all types, which is entirely different from the policy
considerations which might underlie a recognition of freedom of silence.
The idea, allied with the one just expressed, that Congress cannot begin
to investigate the matter of political affiliations until a clear a°iid present
danger to government exists, seems to the writer, as to Justice Prettyman,
"sheer folly." 182 Surely, as the Justice points out, Congress cannot determine the existence or nonexistence of a clear and present danger upon
which to legislate if it cannot inquire in advance as to what the facts are.
The most sensible argument with respect to free speech, and one
which finds its clearest expression in Justice Edgerton's dissent in the
Barsky case 183 is that the inquiries of the Un-American Activities Com. mittee, particulady in so far as they attempt to disclose Communist
affiliations, do, as a matter of fact, restrict free speech, since persons are
deterred from expressing their opinions on political questions for fear
of being made the targets of committee charges and publicity. It' is very
179 It now seems clear that the Supreme Court is currently committed to the
so-called "clear and present danger test" in deciding cases arising under the First
Amendment and in free speech cases involving due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, for example, Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190
(1941); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
180 See United States v. Josephson, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82 at 90, 91;
Barsky v. United States, (App. D.C. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241 at 246.
181
(App. D.C. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241.
182
Id. at 246.
188
Id. at 252.
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probable that this is true, since reports of tlie work of the committee
have undoubtedly resulted in harm to individuals branded by it with the
"Communist" label. In view of this record it is reasonable to suppose
that free comment may be discouraged if it happens to be critical of the
government or favorable to economic systems which are not our own
and that, thus, the beneficial policy of the First Amendment may be·
denied complete fulfillment.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that constitutional protection
through judicial review is available to prevent these undesirable consequences. The privilege against self-incrimination, for example, is protected in the constitutional sense by granting immunity from prosecution
no matter what incidental harm may result to the person required to
testify. 184 As was pointed out previously,185 witnesses in judicial proceedings are not protected against the social and economic effects of their
testimony. In both of these situations the public interest in full disclosure
is considered as outweighing the harm resulting to the individual. Here,
as the court said in the Barsky case, "Even assuming private rights of the
timid to be of the fullest weight, the problem remains whether they
outweigh the public necessities in this matter." 186 The restriction on
freedom of speech, to the extent that it exists in the situation at hand, is
not direct but incidental to the exercise of a power of inquiry which in
its general features must be regarded as valid. The public interest in
producing facts may well be sufficient to cause the court to reject an interpretation of the First Amendment which is not literally required.187
It is suggested that a more realistic approach to the problem would
proceed from the assumption that freedom of silence is a "liberty"
protected by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which does not necessarily have the same content as the fr_ee speech
portion of the First Amendment because of the different considerations
giving rise to its recognition. This would perhaps focus attention more
clearly on the true character of the issue as one involving the presence or
absence of social justification for governmental intrusions. Basing what
follows upon this assumption, which appears to be a valid one,188 and
assuming further that the activities of investigating committees are as
184
185

186
187

Supra, pp. 216-217.
Supra, pp. 187-188.

(App. D.C. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 241 at 249.

This has, of course, been the result in all of the cases which have thus far reached
the courts. See notes 176, 177; 178, supra.
188
Supra, note 113; supra, p. 218.
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subject to due process requirements as is other legislative action 189 it
would seem possible to formulate some defensible conclusions as to the
permissible scope of investigatory activities in the area with which we
have been concerned.
One such conclusion would appear to be that unless the resolution
creating an investigating committee shows on its face that no legislation
is contemplated or that no constitutional legislation can be enacted, a
witness is not privileged to refuse to appear and be sworn. 190 This may
be all that can be inferred from the denial of certiorari by the Supreme
Court191 in the Josephson case. 192 The possibility that a committee
empowered to investigate in a particular field may ask questions which
will invade the constitutional liberty of a witness cannot properly be
held to foreclose the committee from proceeding at all, in view of the
generally recognized public interest in the enactment of legislation
having adequate factual support.
Furthermore, it would seem entirely proper for a committee when
dealing with a person who has been engaged in political activity through
acts designed to influence the elective or legislative processes to identify
his interest by disclosing his connections and the sources of his support as
well as the means by which his influence has been exercised. Such disclosures can clearly be compelled by legislation, as has been seen,198 and
the principle which justifies action in this manner is equally applicable
to committee investigations.194
On the other hand, to require the same disclosures from an individual
who has not engaged in such activity would, it is believed, be an unjustifiable interference with his privilege to remain silent. The principle
189
This seems to be sufficiently obvious to need no documentation. The fact that
committee activities are subject to judicial review is shown by the cases cited supra, notes
162and 163.
190
United States v. Josephson, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82. There may
be some question as to whether the court would be bound to accept this in view of the
repeated statements of persons representing the Un-American Activities Committee
that the function of the committee is simply to publicize the activities of subversive
groups. See 47 CoL. L. REv. 416 at 427 (1947). One of the latest is that of Representative· Mundt, then acting chairman, who, as quoted in an Associated Press dispatch of
August 4, 1948, said that the committee is only out to get the whole story of Soviet
spying before the public. "There is nothing we can do legally or legislatively at the
moment."
191
333 U.S. 838, 68 S.Ct. 609 (1948).
192
(C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 165 F. (2d) 82.
198
Supra, pp. 209-213.
194 As a matter of fact there have been a number of congressional investigations of
lobbying. See 47 CoL. L. REV. 98 at 103, note 40 (1947).
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announced in Kilbourn v. Thompson 195 that governmental intrusions
in private affairs are not to be tolerated is still entitled to recognition
although the views of the court as to what are private affairs have
undoubtedly undergone considerable modification. Granted that it may
be difficult to draw the line between private adherence to political organizations and public advocacy of their views, 196 a court which has not
hesitated to define the limits of due process generally by a "gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion" 197 should not shirk the duty
when the protection of a privilege of such importance is involved. Although it has been suggested that the privilege does not directly stem
from the First Amendment, it is closely enough akin to freedom of
speech so that the court should have no difficulty in considering the
matter independently,198 confining the presumption of the validity of
legislative action to the exercise of the power to investigate 199 rather
than the power to demand an answer to a particular question.
If the foregoing suggestions are accepted, it follows that an answer
to the question, "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the
Communist Party" may or may not be compelled, depending not upon the
nature of the question itself but upon the situation of the person to whom
it is addressed. If the witness can be shown to have been engaged in
political activity in the sense mentioned above, the question should be
regarded as a proper one; if not, the converse should be the case.
Turning to .the area of belief or opinion as distinct from action, it
should be concluded that the former matters are privileged against
compulsory disclosure. In many circumstances it may be desirable for a
legislative body to determine who a man is and what he does or has
done. But unless he translates his beliefs into action, what he thinks
should not concern the government. "The Devil himself knoweth not
the mind of man" and Congress should not attempt to out-do his Satanic
Majesty. It is impossible to demonstrate a relation, substantial enough
to prevail against the individual's desire for silence, between the public
interest in disclosure and privately held views as to the form and functions of government. For a court to allow the government to compel
195

103 U.S. 168 (1880).
For example, the dissemination of communist ideology through writings and
motion pictures, with no direct evidence that the influencing of political action is
contemplated may be difficult to classify.
197
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 at 104 (1878).
198
Supra, note 35. Cf. Thomas,v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 at 530 (1945).
199
Cf. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 47 S.Ct. 319 (1927) and the cases
cited supra, notes 66, 67, 68.
196
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such disclosures would indeed amount to judicial approval of thought
control.
• Finally, as was pointed out in the first portion of this discussion,
the privilege of silence should extend to the secrecy of the ballot, so
that it should be considered improper for a committee to interrogate a
witness as to how he has voted in a particular election. Since this principle
has been generally recognized by Congress itself in connection with
election contests,2° 0 it is unlikely that the question will arise.
These conclusions and the premises upon which they are based seem
to the writer to offer a rational solution to a most perplexing problem.
Should they be adopted, adequate protection will be afforded the legitimate interests of the individual while at the same time the necessary
powers of the governme1:1t will be preserved.
20
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